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“no one leaves home unless 
home is the mouth of a shark 
you only run for the border 
when you see the whole city running as well 
 
your neighbors running faster than you 
breath bloody in their throats 
the boy you went to school with 
who kissed you dizzy behind the old tin factory 
is holding a gun bigger than his body 
you only leave home 





















































This paper addresses the contemporary roots and implications of Islamophobic 
sentiments in Italian society by examining a specific case study: the Libyan refugee crisis. I begin 
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by analyzing the history of Italy’s imperialism in Libya between 1911 and 1945, in which I examine 
how Italian imperial practices (coupled with United States and British intervention post World War 
II) have influenced the economic and political state that Libya is in today, in order to understand 
the connections between imperialism and the Libyan refugee crisis. I then provide the theoretical 
framework of Islamophobia, set forth by the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, to 
give context to understand contemporary implications of Islamophobia and what it means for 
Italian identity building. After presenting this conceptual framework, I address the rise of populism 
in Italy to show how right-wing political parties have pushed back against incoming immigrants 
from Muslim majority countries. Understanding the rise of right-wing populism allows for greater 
understanding of how Islamophobia manifests itself when coopted and mobilized by a group of 
people. Then, I examine the various factors that have influenced Italian Islamophobic sentiments 
since the beginning of the Libyan refugee crisis in 2009. This analysis fuses a gap in knowledge 
about the different factors affecting domestic tensions between Italians and Muslim immigrants. 
Moreover, it seeks to determine what factors have allowed the Lega Nord party to enact and 
enforce laws that target refugee communities. After examining these factors, I conclude with a 
glimpse into the future at an attempt to understand how the instituted legislation directed at 







Addressing the systems of governance and economic exploitation that European powers 
institutionalized in their colonies is crucial to understanding the development of modern nations 
after colonialism. In order to understand contemporary migration patterns that have developed 
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between Italy and Libya, it is important to examine how Italy’s imperial past has influenced political 
and economic strife in Libya today. Contextualizing the past in order to understand its effects on 
contemporary issues facilitates a better understanding of how the political and economic strife in 
Libya has forced many to seek refuge outside Libya’s borders. Until the 1980’s, Italy was a country 
with significant out migration, and the recent influx of refugees from Libya has not only challenged 
the Italian state to extend its resources to a new community of people seeking economic 
prosperity, it has challenged the homogenous, European, Catholic identity that Italy has fostered 
since 1871, leading to domestic tensions between Italians and Muslim refugees that has 
manifested as institutionalized racism. Between 1970 and 2015, the number of Muslims in Italy 
increased from roughly 2,000 to 2 million. That is, the percentage of Muslims of the total 
population of Italy increased from less than 1% to 3.7%, the fourth largest percentage in Europe 
(Hackett, 2016). Due to recent economic and political strife in Libya, a yearly average of 170,000 
refugees have found themselves on the borders of Southern Italy. Resultantly, the large influx of 
immigration to Italy from Libya and other Muslim majority countries has prompted Islamophobic 
sentiments within Italian society and right-wing political parties have coopted these sentiments to 
fuel a structured, tangible movement against Muslims living in Italy.  
Therefore, through the examination of Italy’s colonial history in Libya (specifically its use 
of violence and economic exploitation), this paper seeks to address the factors that have 
influenced the rise of Islamophobic sentiments in Italy, how Islamophobia operates in 
contemporary Italian society and politics, and the transition in immigration policy that has forcibly 
repatriated thousands of Libyans. Through the lens of the theoretical framework of Islamophobia, 
I analyze how, despite some scholars’ claims that Italy has successfully integrated Muslim 
refugees, the Italian media’s representation of radical Islam, the rise of right wing, xenophobic 
political parties, and the promotion of a homogenous Italian identity have allowed for the 
enactment and enforcement of laws targeting refugee integration and endorsed a general mistrust 
of Muslim peoples.  
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Historical Roots of Contemporary Immigration 
Libya’s Pre-Colonial Moment 
Italian imperial interests in Libya date back to 1880, when the government declared its 
desire for two trading posts on Libya’s North coast, Cyrenaica and Tripoli. Five years later, at the 
Berlin Conference of 1885, Italy formally acquired rights to penetrate Libya from stronger imperial 
powers, the British and French. Between 1900 and 1911, the Italian press began calling on the 
Italian government to seek control of Tripoli, arguing that the region (Cyrenaica and Tripoli) 
“naturally belonged to the Italians” as it was historically part of the Roman Empire. (Lutsky, 1969, 
Diplomatic Preparations section, para. 13). On September 28, 1911 Italy declared its intended 
occupation. The Italian government provided Ottoman Empire with an ultimatum, claiming Italy’s 
interest in providing Tripolitania with the “blessings of progress” (Lutsky, 1969, The Italo-Turkish 
War of 1911 section, para. 1). In exchange for the gifts of progress, the Ottomans were asked to 
stand down and not resist the new occupation. The Young Turk government responded 
peacefully, stating they were willing to meet Italian demands as long as they aligned with 
Ottomans interests. However, they objected to a permanent occupation, resulting in Italy’s 
declaration of war on September 29, 1911.  
Overall, Ottoman forces were no match for the Italian navy. The Italian fleet blockaded 
Tripoli by sea and British forces refused to let Ottoman troops pass through Egypt. Therefore, the 
Ottoman Empire could not send reinforcements and food supplies, causing a famine in Libya. The 
war was short lived with an Italian to Ottoman troop ratio of 50,000 to 7,000. Within two months 
the war was over, and on November 5, 1911 Italy officially annexed Tripoli. In following peace 
negotiations, the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1912, the Ottomans withdrew their troops and high 
officials. However reluctant, the Ottoman Empire refused to recognize Italian sovereignty over all 
of Libya1 (Raza, 2012, p. 18-19). On an international level, other imperial European powers 
                                                     
1  Upon the annexation of Tripoli in 1911, Italy changed its name to Libya. 
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(Russia, Britain, France, Germany) objected to Italy’s decision to invade Libya. They viewed Italy’s 
expansionist policies as a violation of international norms and contrary to the liberal ideals of the 
Risorgimento. Upon formal declaration of invasion, however, none of these powers sought to stop 
Italy from what it was doing. Instead, they adopted policies of non-interference, hinged upon 
Italian support of their own colonial endeavors. Therefore, upon arrival in Libya, Italian settlers 
quickly established the new territory as their “promised land” (Jayne, 2010, p. 28). In Tripoli, the 
Italian navy established bases, Catholic missionaries established mission sites, and banks and 
schools were opened. 
Nevertheless, upon conquest in 1911, Italians were convinced of Libya’s strategic 
geography.2 They believed its location served as the gateway to the center of Africa and that its 
lands could be revived once the desert was conquered. The government was also convinced that 
Libya was a “’Little Eden’ where farming would flourish and where the unskilled could prosper” 
(Jayne, 2010, p. 28). However, the true underlying rationalization of its conquest was to serve as 
a place of emigration for an overpopulated peasant class in southern Italy. In order to send large 
groups of Italian citizens to live in Libya, the government devised a “gradualist policy of slow 
economic penetration,” wherein Italian businessmen bought Libyan commercial and 
manufacturing interests (which sought to monopolize Libya’s shipping lines and export industry), 
to employ Italians and gain economic profit (Raza, 2012, p. 7). 
Despite economic presence, Italians were never welcomed in Libya. Between 1912 and 
1922, they were met with resistance from the Sanusi, a jihadist Order that was designed to protect 
the Islamic world from the ‘outer’ world. The Italians were unable to crush this resistance. The 
Sanusi Order, founded by Sayyid Muhammad bin Ali al-Sanusi, was developed in 1798 is 
response to Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt. The order was founded to create “awareness within 
the Muslim world of the innate power and threat Europe was to embody” (Raza, 2012, p. 8). 
                                                     
2 Tripoli is short for Tripolitania. 
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Moreover, it developed mutually beneficial economic and political relationships with indigenous, 
Bedouin tribes that helped it harvest political power and exert influence in regional, North African 
affairs. By 1899, the Sanusi Order had developed “a monopolistic economic control over the 
Eastern Sahara and associated that with control over the internal power structures of tribal 
society” (Raza, 2012, p. 11).  
Between 1876 and 1883, al-Mahdi resisted Ottoman demands for reinforcements in wars 
against the Russians, Egyptian Arabi Pasha, and the Sudanese Mahdi. By 1902, under al-Mahdi 
(al-Sanusi’s son), the Sanusi Order had developed into a full-swing resistance movement. 
However, resistance was not in full swing until 1902 when the French invaded the Saharan 
territories. When the French invaded, they destroyed religious houses, and, when the Italians did 
the same in Cyrenaica, “the Order had no choice but to mount a resistance” (Raza, 2012, p. 13). 
Therefore, while the land and sea blockade forced Ottoman defeat, the Sanusi Order refused to 
accept Italy’s annexation without a fight. Their resistance movements began during the Italo-
Turkish War and continued on-and-off throughout the entire time that Italy was present in Libya 
between 1911 and 1951. As Raza reclaims, “The Sanusi Chief al-Sharif (grandson of the 
Founder) against the advice of his councillors made the decision to throw the Order into the 
struggle and in essence transform the trade-orientated organisation into a guerrilla force” (Raza, 
2012, p. 20). The realization that Italian forces were unable to defeat the Sanusi resistance 
brought about the years of the accords. Between the 1916 and 1922, “the Italian policy, unable to 
crush the resistance, shifted its direction to making peace with the Sanusi” (Raza, 2012, p. 29). 
In these negotiations, Italy was forced into a multidimensional treaty that obliged the government 
to recognize Sanusi Order autonomy as well as Libyan religious autonomy and Islamic judiciary 
customs. It also granted Cyrenaica a parliament which was established in 1920. Moreover, to 
silence further resistance movements, Muhammad Idris, head of the Sanusi Order, became 
formally recognized as a prince and was given a stipend of 300,000 lire per month (Raza, 2012, 
p. 31). 
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From Sphere of Influence to Colony 
In 1934, Libya was formally declared a colony of Italy, a result of a long fought process 
that sought to relocate Southern Italy’s growing peasant class. This phenomenon, known as 
demographic colonization, refers to “the transplantation of self-supporting groups of peasants 
from the mainland.” (Jayne, 2010, p. 27) In 1932, prior to its official declaration as a colony, the 
Italian government created the Libyan Colonization Board to devise a plan for transporting Italian 
families to Libya. However, until claiming Libya as a formal colony, Italy was hesitant to foster 
unity between its two provinces (Tripoli and Cyrenaica) because it feared a growing alliance 
between Arabs and Bedouins. The government feared Italian forces stood no chance to the tribal 
governance these two groups desired. Despite these fears, the Italian government still sought to 
unify Italy and Libya. In 1929, the two administrations were “consolidated… under a single 
governor with the capital in Tripoli.” In 1934 the press officially announced the unification of Libya, 
which would later become a territorial extension to the Kingdom of Italy in 1939 (Jayne, 2010, p. 
27-28).  
However, despite spending almost 30 years fully conquering Libya, Italian colonization 
efforts in Libya were largely unsuccessful until the latter half of the 1930’s. By 1937 only 300 
families had settled in Libya, but that number continued to double and by 1939 more than 110,000 
Italian immigrants were settled. Under Italo Balbo, the Italian Governor-General of Libya, all Italian 
families that came to Libya were guaranteed prosperity. The Italian government ensured 
immigrant success by giving each family a car, a strategic plan that allowed immigrants to travel 
further into the interior of Libya to expand colonial settlements outside of Tripoli and Cyrenaica 
(Jayne, 2010, p. 32).  
Lasting Impacts of Imperialism on Libyan Infrastructure 
Despite the government’s claimed success, Italy’s colonial endeavors in Libya had lasting 
impacts that are still echoed today. In its wars against the Sanusi Order and other Bedouin tribes, 
Italian rule displaced more than 20,000 people, most of whom took refuge in Egypt. The Italians 
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also placed more than 100,000 rebels in concentration camps with harsh, life threatening 
conditions. Altogether, the estimated number of people who died under Italian rule (either by 
fighting, disease, or starvation) is around 80,000. Moreover, throughout their regime, Italian rulers 
actively repressed Bedouin peoples to advance the development of its settler colony for Italian 
immigrants. As historian Dusti R. Jayne says, 
not only must the Bedouin be kept off the fertile plateau but [they] must be stabilized in the 
country on the edge of the wilderness (predesertico) where, in his opinion, they had 
sufficient and suitable land for pasturing and sowing. It was often Italian policy to take the 
best coastal lands from Bedouin landowners, sometimes with compensation, other times 
without it (Jayne, 2010, p. 35). 
By the end of its colonial regime, Italy had followed in the footsteps of other imperial powers by 
subjugating indigenous Libyan populations in various ways. However, these actions were not 
without consequence, and following independence on December 24, 1951, Italian settlers were 
expelled by Libyan officials (St. John, 2008). 
 Discussing the large patterns of out-migration is a key component of understanding the. 
lasting impacts of Italian dominion in Libya that have propelled Libya into its current state of strife. 
At the end of World War II, when Italy lost control of its colonial holdings, the United States and 
Britain intervened in Libya’s domestic politics with the “protection and assistance of the United 
Nations” to impose Western leaning Muhammad Idris as the rightful King (Vandewalle, 2012). In 
1969, Idris was overthrown by Libyan nationalists under the leadership of Muammar Qaddafi, 
which led the country into three decades free of U.S. and British involvement. Between 1970 and 
2000, the Libyan economy flourished as Qaddafi used the revenues from Libyan oil reserves to 
invest in education and social welfare programs and provide education for everyone. However, in 
the early 2000’s, fearing U.S. intervention, Qaddafi moved his regime to the right. He imposed 
austerity measures and cut programs and access to resources for the poor. Simultaneously, while 
attempting to improve relations with Libya, the U.S. worked behind the scenes and bribed officials 
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within Qaddafi’s government, organized an intelligence team on the ground to operate as a 
counter-insurgency, and collaborated with NATO to wage a bombing campaign (Vandewalle, 
2012).  
Today, the Western backed war in Libya is at the heart of the strife that has ensued since 
2004 which has patronized free speech and forced hundreds of thousands of people out of Libya 
and into Italy. As multiple rebel groups continue to fight for control of Libya’s de facto government, 
“even Libyans aren’t protected. Because of the war and the spread of weapons, even Libyans are 
leaving the country because they don’t feel secure”3 (Salustro, 2016). 
Theoretical Framework of Islamophobia 
Islamophobia is a political construct, set forth in 1997 by the Commission on British 
Muslims and Islamophobia. Essential to its understanding is its connotation; it is a “fear of,” yet it 
is also a racist ideology. Two prominent scholars on Islamophobia, Alfredo Alietti and Dario 
Padovan, associate Islamophobia with two things: one, the fear of the internal enemy, connected 
with the fear of the proximity of the Muslim body, and two, the general view of Islamic civilization 
as a threat to Western, Christian civilization because of its potential to perpetuate terrorism. In 
recent discourse, it has developed into a new category, similar to Antisemitism, called xeno-
racism. It transcends a ‘phobia’ in multiple ways, the most important being its grouping of all 
Muslims into one category: that inferior to Euro-Christian civilization. Moreover, it has called for a 
preservation of “our people” (which represents one way of life, standard of living, and race) and 
an anti-foreignness sentiment. As understood by Zafar Iqbal, “Islamophobia is a new word for an 
old fear.” (Alietti and Padovan, 2013, p. 586). In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, Western 
countries (most prominently the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy) have 
deemphasized the importance of a multicultural society, placing Islam as a threat to the notion of 
European-ness, characterizing Islamophobia as explicitly exclusionary. Moreover, instead of the 
                                                     
3 Testimony given in the film “Libya’s Migrant Trade: Europe or Die” by Mohamed Abu Breda, Deputy 
Director, Libyan Department for Control of Irregular Migration. 
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fear of one, Islamophobia constitutes a fear of all Islamic civilization. As stated by Alietti and 
Padovan, “the guilty party here is the Muslim civilization, reproducing anomic and anonymous 
violent guys, broadly global networked to tear up the social fabric of Western democratic societies” 
(Alietti and Padovan, 2013, p. 586). Therefore, Islamophobia is explicitly exclusionary and has for 
allowed institutionally supported hate crimes and restricted immigration policies from Muslim 
majority countries. In “Rights: Europe's Rising Islamophobia”, Virginie Guiraudon addresses how 
Europe’s far right has occupied public space to assert their culture over Muslim practices. He 
says, “pointedly insulting anti-Muslim actions are increasing… In Italy, the right-wing Northern 
League party organizes processions of pigs on the sites where mosques are to be erected” 
(Guiraudon, 2011).  
S. Sayyid, another prominent scholar on Islamophobia, identifies Islamophobia as a 
“concept that emerges precisely to do the work that categories like racism were not doing” 
(Sayyid, 2014, p. 11). He conceptualizes the ongoing critique within the framework of 
Islamophobia: the differentiation between the philosophical and political. The philosophical 
represents the “lack of clarity about the concept of Islamophobia” while the political involves 
understanding the contestation about Islamophobia that has arisen in trying to answer questions 
of “national security, social cohesion, and cultural belonging” (Sayyid, 2014, p. 11). Furthermore, 
Sayyid argues that the empirical studies of Islamophobia, which analyzes media representations 
and socio-psychological approaches, cannot “provide us with a theoretical clarification” (Sayyid, 
2014, p. 11). He states,  
Islamophobia is rejected not only because there may be a disagreement about whether a 
particular practice or behavior meets the criterion of what constitutes Islamophobia, but 
also because there is a dispute that any such behavior could be considered to be 
Islamophobic, because the concept of Islamophobia lacks any validity (Sayyid, 2014, p. 
12). 
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Therefore, Sayyid’s research provides an important perspective on understanding Islamophobia: 
that which argues Islamophobia does not exist or is too complex to address and define in a single 
term.  
Ultimately, it is evident that justifications for Islamophobia are grounded in its collection of 
lacks (lack of freedom, human worth, and respect for women and queer individuals) and fear that 
Muslims will attempt to institutionalize their beliefs in Christian civilization. While Alietti, Padovan, 
and Sayyid all provide important understandings for Islamophobia, it is seemingly too complex to 
be regarded solely as a fear of Muslims. Instead, Islamophobia should be conceptualized as fully 
encompassing the discrimination, exclusion, and racism that Muslims experience worldwide.  
Islamophobia Enforced Through Policy 
Research on Italian Islamophobia demonstrates that this prejudice has allowed for an 
institutionally structured, racist movement against Muslims living in Italy. As highlighted by Alietti 
and Padovan [in reference to anti-Muslim xeno-racism], “it is becoming something more 
structured, something that we can call a social bonding in order to substitute different forms of 
social organization such as the rule of law or class solidarity and cohesion” (Alietti and Padovan, 
2013, p. 599). Islamophobic sentiments in Italy have prevailed in multiple ways: publically, through 
hate crimes, such as public humiliation for wearing traditional Islamic clothing and vandalizing 
Mosques, and politically, in the Italian Parliament. The Lega Nord (Northern League), a right-wing, 
xenophobic nationalist party that has successfully passed legislation (Bossi-Fini Law and Law 94) 
establishing impediments to offshore rescues, encouraging repatriation of arriving boats, and 
making illegal immigration a criminal offense, has institutionalized Islamophobic sentiments 
(which fully support and encourage public hate crimes against Muslims) and prevailed as the 
vanguard of this racist movement (Alietti and Padovan, 2013, p. 599). As Virginie Guiraudon 
states, “the far right in Europe has occupied public space to aggressively assert their culture 
against Moslem practices. Pointedly insulting anti-Muslim actions are increasing… In Italy, the 
right-wing Northern League party organizes processions of pigs on the sites where mosques are 
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to be erected” (Guiraudon, 2011). Furthermore, the Lega Nord has campaigned to build an 
“internal enemy” which endorses logic of social antagonism (Alietti and Padovan, 2013, p. 589). 
The party has utilized popular, nationalist Islamophobic sentiments and coopted them for their 
own benefit, using racist discourse to push legislation that is harmful to future Muslim refugees 
and immigrants seeking refuge in Italy.  
To better understand how Islamophobia operates in Italy, it is crucial to examine the 
implemented immigration policies that have failed to integrate incoming Muslim refugees. 
Altogether, Italy’s response to the Libyan refugee crisis has had both social and political 
implications. Since 2014, policy has been drafted, redrafted, and changed. The initial influx of 
migration from Libya that occurred between 2009 and 2014 allowed Italy to implement a policy 
called Mare Nostrum (“Our Sea” in Latin). This policy, presented as a humanitarian and security 
operation, allowed for offshore rescuing of boats with refugees heading towards Italian waters. 
Through Mare Nostrum, Italy was able to safely bring in over 150,000 refugees. However, the 
large influx of refugee from Libya sparked criticism from the European Union and Italian citizens 
who condemned Italian leaders for making E.U. borders too easily accessible. Mare Nostrum, 
which cost the Italian government 9 million Euros per month, was ultimately replaced by a Triton, 
an E.U. initiative to maintain border security (Girard, 2016, p. 9).  
As immigrants kept coming into Italy and the Lega Nord continued developing popular 
sentiment throughout Italy, its members worked to pass two important laws that have significantly 
impacted how the Italian government addresses incoming refugees. The first law, passed in 2002, 
is Bossi Fini Law. Bossi Fini Law was drafted in 2001 as a response to the increase in “criminal 
activities such as drug-pushing, prostitution and petty crime.” (Eurofound, 2002). While it was not 
drafted as a response to the Libyan refugee crisis, it is still applicable to the waves of migration 
coming from Libya because it promotes intolerance to immigration, especially to those seeking 
economic prosperity and political refuge. According to Eurofound, the European Foundation for 
the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, “[Bossi Fini] has led a part of the [Italian] 
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population to have intolerant attitudes towards immigrants, fueled and exploited by some political 
parties such as the Lega Nord” (Eurofound, 2002). Bossi Fini Law is explicitly exclusionary to 
refugees because it welcomes high-skilled workers but sets quotas on low-skilled labor. The law 
states, 
there are no limitations to entry into Italy for highly-skilled workers (university lecturers and 
professors, professional nurses etc.)… and a specific immigration office is to be set up in 
each province of Italy to oversee the entire recruitment procedure for immigrant workers 
on both open-ended and fixed-term contracts (Eurofound, 2002).  
Furthermore, Bossi Fini Law limits access to Italian residency permits, denies state protections 
and citizenship rights to non-EU minors, and arrests and deports any persons discovered as 
undocumented. The second law, passed in 2009, is Law 94. Unlike Bossi Fini Law, Law 94 was 
implemented as a direct response (by the Lega Nord) to large influxes of migration from North 
Africa to Italy. Moreover, it was implemented because “the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs 
estimated that between 2000 and 2006, between 60% and 75% of irregular aliens in Italy had 
entered the country legally but had overstayed their visit” (Komada, 2011, p. 459). Of the two laws 
examined in this research, Law 94 has greater implications, because it was passed in accordance 
with Italian Penal Code, allotting harsher punishments for refugees and illegal immigrants that are 
discovered to undocumented. Law 94 states that illegal immigrants are subject to jail time if they 
refuse to present their documentation to law enforcement and are subject to a fine if they are 
found to be residing in Italy illegally. Articles 6 and 10 of Law 94 state, “in case the foreigner 
refuses to show these identification documents (s)he is punished with a fine up to 2000 euro and 
up to 1-year imprisonment” and “illegal entry and stay in the territory of the State: is punished with 
a fine from 5,000 up to 10,000 euro.” (Law 94, Article 6.2, Article 6.3, and Article 10). However, 
Law 94 does not only affect illegal immigrants. It punishes anyone that employs or protects illegal 
immigrants. Articles 12 and 22.12 of Law 94 state, 
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sanctions with 6 months to 3 years (convertible in fine under 2 years) imprisonment for 
those who locate or sell housing to individuals who do not have a regular stay permit at the 
moment of the signing/renewal of the contract… and those who employ irregular migrants 
are punished with 6 months to 5 years’ imprisonment and with a sanction up to 5000 euro 
for every person irregularly employed (Law 94, Articles 12 and 22.12) 
Therefore, the intention of using Law 94 to affect the lives of those with proximity to illegal 
immigrants, along with using it to challenge illegal immigrants’ lives in the private sphere (including 
sports and leisure), makes it nearly impossible for them to exist without adhering to the strict 
immigration system that Italy has in place. 
Analysis of Factors Institutionalizing Islamophobia in Italy Today 
Immigration reform implemented in response to the Libyan refugee crisis is one of many 
ways that Islamophobia operates in Italy. Scholars Alfredo Alietti and Dario Padovan argue that 
Islamophobia is grounded through ethnocentrism and in times of authoritarianism and anomie, 
and their research provides important evidence as to how prejudices can be influenced at the 
national level and for political purposes. Most important to this research is the understanding of 
how nationalism propels the occurrence of prejudice because, with regards to national identity, 
Muslims are an “out-group” that do not fit with the rest of society. Furthermore, the promotion of 
a homogenous national identity, such as that in France, denounces individual freedom (i.e. ties 
to a country of origin) and forces compliance, resulting in a relationship of “reciprocal causality 
with prejudice, making this latter a functional substitute for the social and juridical covenant that 
should ensure social harmony and social cohesion” (Alietti and Padovan, 2013, p. 596). 
Therefore, racism is a means to assert dominance and force assimilation but is also a byproduct 
of the attempted creation of social solidarity and an ethno-racial identity. Consequently, when 
there is a suspected threat to one’s own identity, there is an emergence of attitudes, in this case 
European-ness, that favor one’s own hegemonic group identity (Alietti and Padovan, 2013, p. 
597). 
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I would argue the most significant factor triggering Islamophobic sentiments is the belief 
that large influxes of migration can change Italian demographic composition and cultural identity. 
The supposed fear of non-Italians stealing Italian jobs stems from the 2008 economic crisis that 
devastated the Italian economy. Upon the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 (which coincided 
with Italy’s adoption of the Euro), most major Italian banks lost significant shares of their capital. 
The loss of capital depleted the majority of Italy’s financial resources, putting stress on the 
economy and leaving Italy unable to pay off its national deficit (Di Quirico, 2010). Between 2008 
and 2009, Italy’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) decreased by five percentage points and the 
national unemployment rate reached nearly 10% (Eurofound, 2010). With the onset of mass 
migration into Italy that began in 2009, Italians became fearful that the integration of nearly 
300,000 new refugees would strain the government’s resources and propel Italy into further 
economic dissension. Therefore, as refugees continued arriving in Italy, Italians began using their 
protectionist rhetoric to legitimize their refugee push back. In a study done by the Pew Research 
Center, scholars Richard Wike, Bruce Stokes, and Katie Simmons found that “In Hungary, Italy, 
Poland and Greece, more than six-in-ten say they have an unfavorable opinion of the Muslims in 
their country… the dominant view is that Muslims want to be distinct from the rest of society rather 
than adopt the nation’s customs and way of life” (Simmons, et. al., 2016). Aside from economic 
degradation, Italians are fearful of how the influx of Muslim refugees could change the Italian 
identity. Thus, this outcome from the Pew Research Center proves significant because it serves 
to justify Italians’ exclusionary behavior as they strive to preserve their homogenous identity. The 
fact that the “Muslim community [in Italy] is comprised primarily of first-generation immigrants who 
retain strong linguistic, economic, and emotional ties to their country of origin” serves to otherize 
Muslim refugees and allows Italians to believe that because Muslims refuse to assimilate to the 
Italian way of life, they do not belong there (James Toronto, 2008, p. 65). As a result, instead of 
creating space for Islam in Italian policy like in Spain, the Italian government has imposed laws 
that limit its functionality and place in the public sphere. For example, new mosques cannot be 
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built without permission of the government (in which requests are often denied) and throughout 
the entire country there are only eight officially recognized mosques. By comparison, France, 
which has a Muslim population three to four times bigger than Italy’s, has 2,200 mosques, while 
the UK, with a Muslim population approximately twice the size of Italy’s, has 1,500 (Merelli, 2016, 
para. 3).  
While Italians fear the degradation of their economy, their Islamophobic sentiments are 
also grounded through the fear of terrorism and crime. A study conducted by La Sapienza 
University in Rome (interviewing 2,000 students ages 14-18 in over 100 towns) found that 50% 
of Italian youth believe Muslims “support international terrorism” and have “cruel and barbaric 
laws” (Girard, 2016, p. 6-7). Of course this study does not represent the entirety of Italian 
sentiments towards Muslims, but it does highlight a problem that many Italians fail to recognize: 
the words refugee and Muslim are not synonymous. Because the largest proportion of refugees 
coming into Italy are Muslim, most refugees, especially those from Muslim majority countries, 
become homogenized as the “Muslim problem.” However, Muslims are not only stereotyped as 
a homogenous group, they are stereotyped with similar traditions. The acts of few (honor 
killings, rape, and migrant against migrant crime), which are seen as barbaric and 
fundamentalist, emerge to represent the beliefs of all Muslims and prevail in discourse as 
rationale for Italian Islamophobic sentiments. Moreover, members of the Lega Nord coopt acts 
of crime to advance their xenophobic platform. In 2006, Moroccan El Katawi Dafani stabbed and 
killed his daughter after discovering her relations with an Italian man. Although many Italian 
Muslims condemned this killing (including Souad Sbai, a member of the Islamic Italian-
Parliament Party and the Association for Moroccan Women in Italy), the Lega Nord claimed that 
the crime was a representation of Islamic traditions. Enzo Bortolotti stated, “here is another case 
demonstrating that the Islamic culture cannot be integrated into our society” (Girard, 2016, p. 
12). Furthermore, issues surrounding rape and drug trafficking persist at the front of Italian 
Islamophobia. Writer Daniel Greenfield conducted research in which he discovered that 
 20 
immigrants are accountable 40% of rape in Italy, 6.3% of which are Moroccan. His research led 
him to believe that “with statistics like these, it would appear that Italy doesn’t have a problem 
with sexual violence, it has a problem with Muslim immigration” (Girard, 2016, p. 13). 
Greenfield’s statement serves as an example of how, much like the Lega Nord, many Italians 
use certain data to push their anti-Muslim agenda. It is evident that Italy has a problem with 
sexual violence, but, unknown to many Italians who use an “extrinsic viewpoint when 
confronting societal issues,” Islam is not the defining factor of the sexual violence (Girard, 2016, 
p. 13).  
Italian perceptions of Islam are also increasingly based on media representations of 
radical Islam, especially post the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. that set the 
stage for radical Islamic terrorism against the West. As Alietti and Padovan state, “these 
[Islamophobic] prejudices have grown slowly over the time, scarcely contrasted, supported by 
coarse, but clear, discourses and ideologies, diffused by media and by, so called, ‘political 
entrepreneurs of racism’” (Alietti and Padovan, 2013, p. 599). Italian apprehension to welcome 
refugees from the Muslim world stems from the assumption (that the media perpetuates) that 
radical Islamic groups represent the entirety of Islam and that incoming Muslims (who therefore 
support Islamic fundamentalism) will infiltrate Italy with radical, Islamic ideologies, and there is 
ample proof to show how the Italian media has manipulated perceptions of incoming and 
resettled refugees in Southern Italy. The first major media-covered event in 2009 during the first 
wave of Libyan immigration occurred in Lampedusa, Italy’s southernmost island which acts as a 
stepping stone to mainland Italy for many refugees looking to make their way into Europe. 
During this event, temporary residents of a refugee camp escaped and marched peacefully into 
town, demanding rights of freedom and individual human rights (Girard, 2016, p. 8-9). However, 
instead of focusing on the lack of rights these refugees were protesting, the media focused on 
the fact that four men set fire to their migrant shelter. Evidently, the Italian media uses an “us” 
versus “them” rhetoric to demonstrate how incoming refugees are threatening territory and 
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culture that is undoubtedly Italian. Media expert Marco Bruno from La Sapienza University in 
Rome identifies three techniques that the Italian media uses to establish and enhance the 
discourse of the other: the landing issue and the invasion frame, the immigrant as a security 
threat, and the threat to western culture and the religious frame (Bruno, 2016). Bruno also 
highlights headlines from media articles which invoke defensive, nationalist sentiments. He 
states,  
the same frame emerges at the level more strictly of content and terminology. 
“Lampedusa: still an emergency”, “Alarm on immigrants, the invasion has restarted”, 
“Lampedusa, the days of the exodus”, “Immigrants: record landing”, “An assault that our 
country cannot stop”, “The Great invasion has begun”. In all these headlines it clearly 
emerges that the theme of arrival and, by extension, the entire media image of migration 
are articulated in public discourse through the frame of “conquest” (by the “invaders”) and 
“defence” (that is down to the autochthons) of a territory” (Bruno, 2016). 
Therefore, by using rhetoric that projects the dangers of Muslim refugees to the West, 
the Italian media fabricates three boundaries (both physical and cultural) that refugees 
overstep by coming into Italy. Furthermore, Italian Islamophobia scholar Zincone states, 
“the fact that the majority of information in the media regarding immigration concerns 
crime and its repression is certainly of no help in the attempt to establish low-conflict 
relationships and a climate of positive interaction” (James Toronto, 69). Ultimately, the 
manipulation of the media is crucial to advancing Italy’s xenophobic agenda, as referring 
to refugees as illegal immigrants connotes a specific image which sparks hatred and 
distrust of incoming peoples within Italian society.  
Overall, it is evident that the basis of Italian Islamophobic attitudes stem from multiple 
influences: fear that the influx of refugees can strain the Italian economy and challenge the 
homogenous Italian identity, the fear of terrorism, jihadism, and crime, and the perpetuation of 
Islam as fundamentalist via manipulation of the media. Backlash is seen from large scale 
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immigration and media perceptions of Islam, but these xeno-racist sentiments are also grounded 
in right-wing, xenophobic political parties that have institutionalized themselves in the Italian 
parliament. Islam is the second most practiced religion in Italy, yet it is not recognized by the 
Italian state, and because the Catholic Church is still very prevalent in Italian daily life, a rigid 
Italian cultural self-identity is boasted that refuses to incorporate Islam (Haberman, 1988). 
Methods 
This research is based on the work of other scholars, predominantly Alfredo Alietti and 
Dario Padovan who conducted over 1,500 in person interviews [in Italy] about cultural perceptions 
and understandings of Islam, as well as that of S. Sayyid, whose understandings of Islamophobia 
challenge its existence. Based off of the work of others, I have been able to understand and 
formulate my own argument on the roots of contemporary Italian Islamophobia. To better my 
research, I would like to move to incorporate the voices and experiences of a few people, rather 
than focus so much of my understanding of Islamophobia on understandings that represent the 
views of the majority and potentially ignore the voices of those who stand against Islamophobia. 
Moreover, in looking to the future, I may incorporate a policy analysis that seeks to address what 
Islamophobia may look like in Italy in the near future. 
Limitations 
The largest impediment to articulating my own argument is working without produced 
research that argues against Islamophobia specific to Italy. Without this research, it is difficult to 
address a counter argument (something that I believe is crucial to fully articulating my argument) 
that is specific and relevant enough to what I am arguing. There has been sufficient research 
produced arguing that Italy has well integrated second generation Muslim immigrants into Italian 
society (e.g. a study done by Massimo Introvigne that argues the Italian government has created 
a favorable environment for religious minorities), but since my argument does not encompass that 
demographic, it makes it hard to tie in and refute as outside readers may not understand its 
relevance. Despite the fact that the produced research on second generation immigration is not 
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specific enough to effectively measure Islamophobia, one could refute that their integration is 
proof of the Italian state’s tolerance of Islam. To this I would argue that if the Italian state can 
integrate second generation Muslim immigrants they can also integrate incoming immigrations, 
something they have yet to do. 
Conclusion 
Since 2009, Italian immigration policies have transitioned from open, welcoming refugee 
rescue legislation to more conservative, protectionist ideology. There is not one, credible 
distinction for understanding manifestations of Islamophobia in Italy, but scholars are inclined to 
believe that Islamophobic sentiments have increased since September 11, 2001 (and have 
resurfaced since the Paris attacks and Syrian refugee crisis), leaving lasting impacts on relations 
between Italy and the Muslim world. While scholars like Massimo Introvigne suggest that Italy has 
a favorable environment for religious minorities, stating “religious minorities are not seen as 
particularly threatening in Italy, simply because they are comparatively small,” others scholars, 
notably Alfredo Alietti and Dario Padovan, have conducted thousands of interviews that show the 
majority of Italian citizens identify Islam with an immigrant’s country of origin and believe it is a 
religion too traditional to assimilate with Western culture (Introvigne, 2001, p. 276).  
Understanding the roots of Islamophobia is not only crucial to understanding how the West 
defines itself against the East, it is pertinent to understanding the future of political and economic 
relationships between Italy and the Muslim world. That is, in recent discourse, scholars have 
sought to understand the “able-action knowledge” that policy makers use to institutionalize anti-
Muslim sentiments. Understanding the importance of the use of specific vernacular helps us know 
how we in the West can diminish the dichotomy that stands between the two identities. How, if 
even, is this possible? In a critique offered by Ali Akbar Mahdi, he states,  
European assimilationist models should be replaced by integrationist policies allowing full 
participation of Muslims in European society without giving up their Muslim identity. How 
will this be possible? Europe should accept the contribution of Muslim immigrants and 
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Muslims should adjust their religion to broader European cultural framework (Mahdi, 2003, 
p. 629). 
Ultimately, Islamophobic sentiments, perpetuated by media stereotypes and coupled with the lack 
of the Italian government’s recognition of Islam as a state religion, ‘otherize’ Italian Muslims and 
leave no room for Islam to be inherent in Italian society today. When Italians stop resisting the 
infiltration of their hegemonic identity, they can further appreciate the contributions that Muslim 
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